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BANKRUPTCY CLAIMs-NLRB BACK PAY ORDER Is ENTITLED TO
PRIORITY AS A DEBT OWING TO THE UNITED STATES-The NLRB found
that an employer had discriminatorily discharged workmen for union membership, and ordered the employer to provide back pay for the period between their discharge and the employer's offer of reinstatement.J Four
months after the NLRB order, and more than ten months after the period
for which back pay was allowed, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was
filed against the employer. Subsequently the NLRB obtained enforcement
of its order from a circuit court,2 and filed a proof of claim for the back
pay allowance in the bankruptcy proceeding. The referee disallowed the
claim on the grounds, inter alia, that the Board had not been correct in
determining that the employer was liable for an unfair labor practice, and
that in any case the claim was unliquidated. On petition the district court
set aside the referee's order, allowing the claim and giving it a priority
over general creditors. 4 On appeal the district court was affirmed, the
circuit court holding (1) that the NLRB back pay allowance was a provable debt in bankruptcy under § 63a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act as a fixed
liability evidenced by a judgment, 5 and (2) that the back pay allowance
was entitled to priority as a debt owing to the United States under
§ 64a(5).D Nathanson v. NLRB, 194 F.2d 248 (1st Cir. 1952).
The instant decision presents a second route through the Bankruptcy
Act to enforce the back pay policy of the National Labor Relations Act.
In NLRB v. Killoran,7 the only previous decision involving the question
1. In the Matter of Hill Transportation Co. and MacKenzie Coach Lines, Inc.,
75 N.L.R.B. 1203 (1948).
2. NLRB v. Hill Transportation Co. and MacKenzie Coach Lines, Inc., No. 4395,
1st Cir., Dec. 7, 1948.
3. The Board computed the amount of back pay after the petition in bankruptcy
had been filed. It is settled, however, that the amount of liability need not be ascertained as a prerequisite to provability of indebtedness in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U. S. 598 (1937) ; Haynes Stellite Co. v. Chesterfield, 97 F2d
985 (6th Cir. 1938). The district court in the instant case allowed the Board two
months in which to fix the amount of back pay due. See It re Schroeter, 52 F. Supp.
667 (E.D.N.Y. 1943).
4. In re MacKenzie Coach Lines, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 489 (D. Mass. 1951).
5. 52 STAT. 873 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 103a(1) (1946) : "Debts of the bankrupt
may be proved and allowed against his estate which are founded upon (1) a fixed
liability, as evidenced by a judgment or an instrument in writing, absolutely owing at
the time of the filing of the petition by or against him, whether then payable or
not . . ."
6. 52 STAT. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104a(5) (1946) : "The debts to have priority,
in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors, and to be paid in full out of the
bankrupt estates, and the order of payment, shall be . . . (5) debts owing to any
person, including the United States, who by the laws of the United States in [sic]
entitled to priority . . .'
7. 122 F.2d 609 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 696 (1941). The case was
widely commented on. E.g., 90 U. oF PA. L. REv. 100 (1941) ; 40 COL. L. REv. 1272
(1940); 55 HARv. L. REv. 539 (1942).
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of back pay allowance in a bankruptcy proceeding, the Court of Appeals

for the Eighth Circuit held (1) that the NLRB order was a provable debt
under § 63a(4) of the Bankruptcy Act as an implied contract, in this case
an obligation imposed by statute, and (2) that it was entitled to priority as
wages earned under § 64a(2).8 There is no provision in the Bankruptcy
Act specifically including NLRB back pay orders within the limited categories of provability under § 63 or priority under § 64. To be included,
therefore, they must be handled largely by analogy.9 The courts are apparently willing, at least with respect to NLRB orders, to approach bankruptcy claims in this light, although sometimes in the past they have hewed
more closely to the language of the Bankruptcy Act, 10 thus necessitating
legislative amendment to bring new types of claims within the Act."
The First Circuit Court in the instant case analogized an administrative order to a court judgment for the purpose of proving the existence

of a debt against the bankrupt under § 63a(1). Judgments against the
debtor are res judicata in subsequent bankruptcy proceedings, 12 and like
effect was given the NLRB order against the employer. Where Congress
has delegated exclusive authority to the NLRB to determine liability on
particular facts, no violence is done to the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act
8
in allowing the Board's orders to be conclusive on the bankruptcy court.'
Whether the liability is judicial or quasi-judicial, however, it cannot be
allowed as a provable debt if it constitutes a penalty or fine against the
bankrupt. 14 The purpose of NLRB back pay orders has been expressly
stated as remedial toward the employees rather than punitive against the
employer,' 5 and damages are computed accordingly; hence, allowance of
the orders in bankruptcy would not have the sole effect of penalizing
8. 52

STAT.

874 (1938),

11 U.S.C. § 104a(2)

priority . . . shall be . . . (2)

(1946): "The debts to have

wages, not to exceed $600 to each claimant, which

have been earned within three months before the date of the commencement of the
proceedings . . ."

9. Cf. Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598 (1937) (bank stockholders' statutory liability to creditors held to be an implied contract provable in bankruptcy).
10. E.g., Lane v. Industrial Com'r, 54 F.2d 338 (2nd Cir. 1931) (workmen's
compensation award, although determined by a quasi-judicial administrative agency
and although it was an obligation imposed by statute on the employer, was neither
a judgment nor an implied contract within the meaning of § 63 of the Bankruptcy Act,
and hence not a debt provable in bankruptcy).
11. The decision in the Lane case, supra note 10, soon brought forth an amendment to § 63 explicitly making workmen's compensation awards provable in bankruptcy. 48 STAT. 911 (1934), 11 U.S.C. § 103a(6) (1946). Cf. In re Dearborn Mfg.
Corp., 92 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1937).
12. Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U. S.726 (1946).
13. Cf. Smith v. Hoboken R. Co., 328 U.S. 123 (1946) (bankruptcy court must
stay its hand in reorganization until ICC considers proposed forfeiture of railroad
lease).
14. § 57j of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 93j (1946), prohibits allowance of
penalties. See United States v. Paddock, 187 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1951) ; see Ii're
Shawsheen Dairy, 47 F. Supp. 494, 497 (D. Mass. 1942).
15. See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257 (1939) ; Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 236 (1938). Cf. Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941) (discharged employees' actual earnings during period
of discharge are deductible from back pay allowances against employer).
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other bona fide creditors for the wrongs of the bankrupt. Liability imposed by an NLRB order is not affected by subsequent events such as
the death of the employer,' 6 the death of the employeelr or the elimination
of the place of business. 18 Subsequent bankruptcy of the employer presents no stronger reason to alter his liability for back pay. For the purpose of fixing liability within the meaning of § 63a(1), therefore, an administrative adjudication such as an NLRB back pay order ' 9 may well be
given the same effect as a court judgment. Nevertheless, it is difficult to
say that the First Circuit Court's treatment of the Board's claim as a
judgment is preferable to the Eighth Circuit's treatment of the claim as an
implied contract, 20 since both courts reached the same result of allowing
the Board's order to be proven in the bankruptcy proceeding.
More crucial is the difference between the courts on the relative priority to be given an order of the Board in a bankruptcy proceeding. In
the instant case the First Circuit held that the back pay allowance was
entitled to a fifth priority as a debt owing to the United States. It is true
that back pay allowances are not private rights enforceable 2 ' or assignable 22 by the employees. The employees receive the back pay only through
the Board and need not be present or parties to the proceedings against
the employer.P Heretofore, however, the governmental priority under
2 4
§ 64a(5) had been utilized almost solely by the United States directly
16. NLRB v. Colten, 105 F.2d 179 (6th Cir. 1939) (back pay order enforced
against estate of partner whose death terminated the partnership after order was
issued).
17. See NLRB v. Hearst, 102 F.2d 650, 664 (9th Cir. 1939) (back pay order is
enforceable even where reinstatement is impossible because employee died after
order was issued).
18. See Waterman S.S. Corp. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 760, 763 (5th Cir. 1940) (back
pay order in favor of seamen is enforceable although employer subsequently sold ship).
19. The procedure whereby the NLRB must obtain judicial enforcement of its'
order in a circuit court under § 10(e) of the National Labor Relations Act would not
seem to affect the order's finality. The scope of the circuit court's jurisdiction is
identical whether the Board seeks enforcement under § 10(e) or an aggrieved person
seeks review under § 10(f). Moreover, § 10(b) requires the Board to adopt so far
as practicable in its proceedings the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which brings
the Board closer to a purely judicial function than most administrative agencies.
§ 10(g) provides that commencement of proceedings under either § 10(e) or § 10(f)
shall not operate as a stay of the Board's order unless specifically ordered by the

court. 61 STAT. 146 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §160 (Supp. 1947).
20. See Comments cited note 7 supra.
21. Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 267
(1940).
22. NLRB v. Stackpole Carbon Co., 128 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1942). Nor may the
back pay allowance be garnished from the employer by the employee's creditors.
NLRB v. Sunshine Mining Co., 125 F.2d 757 (9th Cir. 1942).
23. National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940).
24. The major exception has been the series of relatively recent FHA cases.
E.g., Korman v. FHA, 113 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1940); It re Weil, 46 F. Supp. 14
(M.D. Pa. 1942). It should be noted that § 64a(5) gives fifth priority only to debts
entitled to priority "by the laws of the United States." It has been generally said,
therefore, that another law is necessary to give claims of the United States the fifth
priority under the Bankruptcy Act. See CoLnmR, BANKRU rcY § 64.502 (14th ed.
1941). This law is the long-standing REV. STAT. §3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191
(1946), which gives the government first satisfaction against its insolvent debtors.
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or by sureties bound to the United States. 25 Claims of governmental
priority filed in bankruptcy proceedings by other governmental agencies,
such as the Federal Housing Administration 26 or the Emergency Fleet
Corporation,2 7 provide little precedent for ruling on the status of an NLRB
claim, because of the uniqueness of the statutory scheme that requires the
employer to repair for his unfair labor practices. The thrust of the National Labor Relations Act back pay provisions would appear to be aimed
at placing discriminatorily discharged employees in the same economic
position as those employees retained.2 8 Employees retained by an employer who subsequently becomes bankrupt are entitled to second priority
for their wages earned within the time and amount limitations of § 64a(2) .29
The policy of the National Labor Relations Act, therefore, operating within
the requirements of the Bankruptcy Act, would seem to suggest that discharged employees who have been awarded back pay receive like treatment.
This is the result reached by the Eighth Circuit Court in the Killoran
case 3 0 In the instant case.such treatment would have left the back pay
order without any priority, since the period for which back pay was ordered,
and even the order itself, did not come within the three month limitation
of § 64a(2). 1 The probable rationale for the limitations on wage priority
is that if an employee chooses to remain with his employer unpaid for
longer than three months, or until the employer owes him more than $600
in wages, he voluntarily takes his chances as a general creditor for the
additional time and amount. The rationale does not apply, however, where
an employee has been put out of employment involuntarily, and is subsequently allowed back pay for the period of involuntary discharge by the
NLRB. The fact is that any analogy between a Board order and the priority categories of § 64 will be inexact. What order of priority, if any, a
back pay allowance should receive in the distribution of a bankrupt emThe first satisfaction is superseded by the fifth priority of §64a(5) insofar as the
insolvent becomes a bankrupt within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. The court
in the instant case apparently disregarded this technical route in giving the NLRB
claim priority under §64a(5).
25. E.g., Bramwell v. U.S. Fidelity Co., 269 U.S. 483 (1926).
26. Korman v. FHA, 113 F.2d 743 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (claims of government
agency is entitled to priority in bankruptcy proceedings as a debt owing to United
States) ; United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940) semble. But see United
States v. Emory, 314 U.S. 423, 434n.2 (1941) (dissenting opinion). Cf. United States
v. Remund, 330 U.S. 539 (1947) (debt owing to Farm Credit Administration is debt
owing to United States within REv. STAT. § 3466).
27. U.S. Emergency Fleet Corp. v. Wood, 258 U.S. 549, 570 (1922) (claim of
government corporation is not entitled to priority in bankruptcy proceedings as a debt
owing to United States).
28. See cases cited note 15 supra.
29. See note 8 supra.
30. Cf. Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358 (1946) (NLRB back pay
award constituted "wages" within meaning of Social Security Act) ; In re Public
Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947) (vacation pay held to be "wages earned"
within meaning of § 64a(2)).
31. Strom v. Peikes, 123 F2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1941) (under §64a(2) the only
wages entitled to priority are those earned within three months before date when
bankruptcy petition is filed); 51 YALE L.J. 863 (1942).
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ployer's assets is a question not answered by either the National Labor
Relations Act or the Bankruptcy Act. The most that can be said concerning the court's answer in the instant case is that, in the absence of a
more specific legislative provision, it resolved the policies of the two acts
in favor of the workmen discharged for union membership and against the
general 'corporate creditors.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-TRADE-MARKS-EFFECT OF LANHAm ACT ON

UNITED STATES TRADE-MARKS REGISTERED BY NoN-OWNER IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY-Bulova Watch Company, a New York corporation, sued
a United States citizen whose domicile was in Texas, seeking to enjoin
him from using the name "Bulova" on watches sold by him in Mexico.
It appeared that in 1933 the defendant, discovering that the name "Bulova"
was not registered in Mexico, had the name registered himself. Thereafter
until the present suit he had watch parts shipped from Switzerland and the
United States to Mexico and assembled there, stamping the name "Bulova"
on the completed product. When the plaintiff received numerous complaints from purchasers of the spurious "Bulova" watches, it instituted cancellation proceedings and an action for trade-mark infringement in Mexico.
To date the plaintiff has not been successful in this litigation. At the same
time, the instant suit was brought in the district court at the defendant's
domicile. The court of appeals, reversing the district court's dismissal of
the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, held that
the federal courts may enjoin a United States citizen from trade-mark infringement and unfair competition in a foreign country even though the
act complained of might not constitute an actionable wrong there. Bulova
Watch Co. v. Steele, 194 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1952).
The problem presented by the instant case is not the existence of jurisdiction, but the propriety of exercising it. Under conflict of laws rules
as generally stated, the creation of tort liability is governed by the law
of the place where the alleged wrong occurred, and the place of the wrong
is where the last act occurred.- In the case of trade-mark infringement,
the place of wrong is where the customer was deceived by the defendant's offer.2 Since all sales were made in Mexico, it would seem that
Mexican law should apply, and under Mexican law the defendant's acts
were not illegal or tortious. However, the courts of this country have been
willing to make numerous exceptions to these rules. One of these is the
public policy exception which justifies the non-application of foreign law
which is offensive to the policy of the forum. However, only rarely will
See Holmes, J., in American
1. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909), ". . . the general and
almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done."
2. RESTATMENT, CoNFLICT OF LAws §377, illustrations 5, 6 (1934).
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the doctrine be utilized to disregard a foreign law favoring the defendant.3
Another exception is found where the wrongful act complained of is an
element of an over-all scheme partly occurring in this country. This approach ignores the "last act" rule. In Vacuum Oil Co. v. Eagle Co.,4 plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from infringing its trade-mark. The defendant, a New Jersey corporation, shipped oil in barrels to Germany,
where its German manager marked the barrels with plaintiff's mark and
sold them. Although the wrong was not consummated until the sale in
Germany and defendant's activities were not shown to be unlawful under
German law, the court granted relief, finding that the scheme resulting in
the infringement originated and was largely executed in this country. 5
However, a subsequent case, Luft v. Zande,6 in effect repudiated the
Vacuum Oil doctrine. Plaintiff, owner of the "Tangee" trade-mark, identifying a well-known lipstick, sought to enjoin a competitor and deliberate
infringer from using a deceptively similar name on his product, which
was shipped to all parts of the world. With respect to defendant's activities in "countries where both parties [were] doing business and defendants [had] established their right by local law to use the name
'Zande'," 7 the court refused to grant relief, on the ground that to do so
would give U. S. trade-marks an extraterritorial effect. The court made
its ruling despite proof that all shipments were made and all activities directed from the United States.
A final theory by which the courts have circumvented the strict conflict of laws rules is to find that defendant's acts, although legal by the
foreign law, have had an unlawful effect on United States commerce. In
a leading case, United States v. Sisal Sales Corp.,8 the government sought
to enjoin violations of the Sherman and Wilson Acts. Defendants, through
procurement of discriminatory legislation in Mexico and Yucatan, had established a monopoly over sisal in interstate and foreign commerce. The
Supreme Court affirmed the granting of an injunction, saying that, although
the monopoly was consummated in foreign countries, defendants "brought
about forbidden results in the United States." 9 This is the theory relied
upon in the instant case. There was testimony to the effect that large
numbers of American tourists, especially those living near the border,
bought defendant's spurious "Bulova" watches in Mexico and brought them
back into this country. Thereafter, plaintiff received numerous complaints
3. See Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33
L. 736, 747 (1924).
4. 154 Fed. 867 (C.C.D.N.J. 1907), aff'd, 162 Fed. 671 (3d Cir. 1908), cert.
denied, 214 U.S. 515 (1909).
5. See also Hecker H-0 Co. v. Holland Food Corp., 36 F.2d 767 (2d Cir. 1929).
6. 142 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 756 (1944).
7. Id. at 540.
8. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
9. Id. at 276. This case has also been interpreted to illustrate the public policy
theory. See 4 CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKs 2240 (1950). For
other cases using the effect on commerce theory, see, e.g., Thomsen v. Cayser, 243
U.S. 66 (1917); United States v. Hamburg-Amerikanische Paketfahrt Aktiengesellschaft, 200 Fed. 806 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1911).
YALE
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about them. The Lanham Trade-Mark Act,10 in which Congress, for
the protection of American marks, used its powers under the Commerce
Clause" to the fullest extent,12 prohibits the importation of products
copying the name of any domestic manufacturer.13 That provision was
ineffective to check the practice of tourists bringing back watches purchased in Mexico. The court found that the defendant's activities not
only produced a substantial effect on foreign commerce 1 4 contrary to
Congressional Protective intent but also resulted in an injury to plaintiff's
reputation in domestic commerce. Therefore, this was deemed an appropriate case in which to exercise jurisdiction.
Protection against trade-mark infringement in foreign countries presents a serious problem to American owners of marks. This is especially
true in Latin and South American countries, into whose markets United
States manufacturers are entering in increased numbers. The law in most
of those countries, as in Mexico, is that the first registrant, not the first
user, is entitled to the mark. 15 Cancellation proceedings in those countries
generally are lengthy and expensive, and there is often small chance for
success. 16 Hence when a defendant, subject to the jurisdiction of this
country's courts, is shown to be acting in bad faith in such a way that his
activities have a detrimental effect upon commerce, it seems desirable for
our courts to enjoin those activities. However, one danger of exercising
jurisdiction in this type of situation should be taken into account. While
courts have not been reluctant to enjoin a defendant from doing an act
abroad, they have consistently refused to order him to do an act in a foreign state, on the ground that the latter might place him in the position of
being forced to perform an act illegal by local law, which in turn would
amount to an unwarranted interference with the affairs of the foreign
state.17 The distinction between an injunction and an affirmative order
has been criticized.1s Prohibition to perform an act may lead to a breach
10. 60 STAT. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. (1947).
11. U.S. CONST. Art. I, §8.
12. See Robert, Commentary on the Lanham Trade-Mark Act in 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1050 at 268-269 (1948).
13. 60 STAT. 440 (1946), 15 U.S.C. §1124 (1947).
14. It is not clear what constitutes the foreign commerce to which the court
refers. Bulova is now advertising in Mexico, and the unfair use of its trade name in
Mexico affects prospective if not present foreign commerce. The court also mentioned the defendant's purchase of watch cases and dials in the United States, which
unquestionably is foreign commerce.
15. See Wilson, Trade-M1farks and Laws in Foreign Countries, 37 T.M. REP. 107,
114 (1947).
16. Mexico is a member of the International Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property. Article 6 bis of the Convention provides that a foreign owner's
mark, well known in the foreign country, shall be protected against registration of an
infringing mark provided that cancellation proceedings are filed within three years
from the date of the infringing registration, or at any time in the case of fraud. The
Inter-American Convention of 1929 contains stronger provisions for the protection
of a prior user, but it has not been ratified by Mexico. Ladas, Trade-Marks and
Foreign Trade, 38 T.M. REP. 278 (1948).
17. See 1 BEAI, THE CONFLICT OF LA~ws §§ 94.2, 96.1 (1935).
18. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWs § 75 (2d ed. 1938).
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of contract binding under the local law. In the instant case, conformance
with the injunction might lead to fewer sales, so that the defendant might
not be able to honor agreements and obligations made under local law
in anticipation of normal continuation of the business. But if the courts
weigh this factor in deciding the propriety of granting injunctive relief
in a particular case, there appears to be no other reason why the theory
of the instant case should not be employed to protect American owners
of trade-marks against fellow citizens acting in bad faith.

CONSTITUTIONAL
MEMBERSHIP IN

AN

LAW-STATUTORY
ORGANIZATION,

PRESUMPTIONS-UNEXPLAINED

KNOWING IT

TO BE SUBVERSIVE,

GROUNDS FOR DISMISSAL OF PUBLIC SCHOOL TEAcHER-Section 12-a
of the New York Civil Service Law, enacted in 1939, authorizes
the disqualification of applicants for state jobs and the removal of jobholders who advocate the forceful overthrow of government. The section
provides de novo review for aggrieved persons, and places the burden of sustaining ineligibility upon the state. Although no proceedings
were ever taken under this statute, the legislature in 1949 passed the
Feinberg Law,' which directs the Board of Regents to adopt regulations for
the rigorous enforcement of § 12-a in the public school system and to make
a listing, after notice and hearing,2 of organizations advocating the overthrow of government. The law further provides that membership in a
listed organization is prima facie evidence of ineligibility. Among the rules
adopted pursuant to this authorization is a presumption that once membership in an organization is established, it continues until shown to have been
terminated in good faith.3 Before any proceedings were instituted, a group
of parents, teachers and taxpayers brought suit for declaratory judgment
and to enjoin enforcement of the unexecuted scheme, alleging that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.
The New York Court of Appeals 4 upheld the validity of the Feinberg Law
as limited by the interpolation that it applies only to persons holding mem5
bership in a listed organization with knowledge of its subversive purpose.
1. N.Y. EDUCATION LAW §3022 (Supp. 1951). The Feinberg Law also supplements N.Y. EDUCATION LAW §3021 (1946), enacted in 1917, which makes the
utterance of treasonable words or commission of treasonable acts grounds for dismissal
of a teacher.
2. In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951),
the court held that when an organization is listed as subversive as a step precedent
to the removal of disloyal federal employees, a hearing is necessary at some stage of
the proceedings prior to dismissal. The Board of Regents is authorized to use the
federal listing.
3. 1 N.Y. CoDEs, RULES AND REGs., pp. 205-206, § 254 (5th Supp. 1950).
4. Thompson v. Wallin, L'Hommedieu v. Board of Regents, Lederman v. Board
of Education, 301 N.Y. 476, 95 N.E.2d 806, 49 MIcE. L. REv. 1219 (1951), afirining
276 App. Div. 527, 96 N.Y.S.2d 466 (2d Dept. 1950).
5. That this was the intent of the Court of Appeals is not certain from the language that anyone may be declared ineligible "who knowingly holds membership in
an organization named upon any listing." 301 N.Y. 474, 494, 95 N.E.2d 806, 814
(1951). The Supreme Court read this to mean knowledge of the purposes of the
organization. Instant case at 386.
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding, first, that a state
may deny employment in its schools to one advocating the overthrow of
the government by force, and second, that such ineligibility may be presumed from a showing that one was a rpember of a listed organization with
knowledge of its advocacy of the forceful overthrow of government. Adler
v. Board of Education, 72 Sup. Ct. 380 (1952).
The first proposition is not surprising in light of prior case law. A
number of recent decisions have established that a sovereign-employer may
reasonably restrict the rights of its citizen-employees for the advancement
of the public service. 6 A state may require a loyalty oath or affidavit disclosing previous dealings with subversive organizations from political candidates 7 and public employees$ to assure the fidelity of public servants to
the fundamental tenets of its scheme of government. Judicial opinions
frequently refer to public employment as a privilege and not a right, 9 but
since it is undisputed that a state cannot deny employment on the basis of
color or creed, 10 talk of privilege represents only a legal conclusion supporting the qualification in question. In the instant case, against the state's
vital concern with the forces at work in its school system, there must be
balanced the harms implicit in any governmental supervision of expression
or association, plus the destruction of the professional careers:" of the dismissed teachers. Less of a "clear and present danger" 12 appears to be required to justify legislative fetters on freedom of expression in areas where
6. See, e.g., United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946), 32 MINN.
L. REv. 176 (1948) (held valid the limitations on political activity of federal employees imposed by the Hatch Act) ; Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir.),
99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 98, aflrined without opinion by an equally divided Court, 341
U.S. 918 (1950) (denied the right of confrontation to federal employee discharged
as disloyal).
7. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Baltimore, 341 U.S. 56 (1950) (oath
required affirmation that candidate was not knowingly a member of a subversive
organization).
8. See Frankfurter, J., concurring-dissenting in Garner v. Los Angeles Board of
Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 725 (1950) (a city ordinance's requirement of a loyalty
oath and an affidavit disclosing prior communist activity was held to be reasonable
and non-compliance a ground for dismissal).
9. See, e.g., McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892), and
cases cited in note 6 supra.
10. See United Public Works v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 100 (1946).
11. "A loyalty trial is the most crucial event in the life of a public servant. If condemned, he is branded for life as a person unworthy of trust or confidence. To make
that condemnation without meticulous regard for the decencies of a fair trial is abhorrent to fundamental justice." Douglas, J., concurring in Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 180 (1950).
12. This test was announced in Schenck v. United States, 247 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
In subsequent application of that test it has been held that mere membership in an
organization advocating the forceful overthrow of government cannot be made criminal.
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937). But cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951).
Dismissal of course is not a criminal sanction, but it is a severe civil
penalty and the distinction between the two cannot be pressed too far. See Bridges v.
Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1944) ; United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1945). In
addition, unlike the anti-syndicalism statutes which applied to all, the Feinberg Law
applies only to persons with a special relation to the state.
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the sovereign has regulatory power beyond the police power-e.g., control
of commerce or the public service. 1 3 But even in these special zones the
constitutional question may turn upon the impact on individuals of the
procedures utilized to reach the intended results.
The procedural innovation of the Feinberg Law is a resort to presumptions to make the state's initial case and place upon the accused the
burden of bringing forward evidence in rebuttal. The Supreme Court accepted these rebuttable presumptions, finding in them the requisite rational
14
connection between the facts proved and the facts presumed, i.e., that
from membership in a listed organization with awareness of its subversive
purposes may be implied personal advocacy of those purposes; and that
membership once established may be presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. However, variations of these presumptions, either in their
application in New York or in imitative, statutes, may raise serious constitutional questions. For example, if a law provided or was in practice
so applied that the single fact of earlier membership, even if subsequently
discontinued, was sufficient for dismissal, the inference of disloyalty from
that finding would be far more tenuous, and a presumption of advocacy of
subversion resting on such a factual base might well be invalid. 1 The
same might be true of a provision decreeing ineligibility on a finding of
membership in a listed organization even without knowledge of its purpose.'6 Under New York law a presumption of fact vanishes entirely
when "substantial" evidence to the contrary is introduced, and does not
operate to shift the risk of non-persuasion. 17 In jurisdictions where a presumption is evidence or shifts the risk of non-persuasion, that increased
burden on the employee will be an additional factor adverse to the constitutionality of legislation otherwise comparable to the New York provisions.
The practical effect of the Feinberg Law will depend in large measure
on two undetermined questions of evidence: first, what evidence tending
to show membership with knowledge of subversive purpose is sufficient
to form a prima facie case, and second, what constitutes "substantial" evi13. See American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 99 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 409 (1950) (use of NLRB facilities denied to unions whose officers did not
submit non-communist affidavits according to the terms of the Taft-Hartley Law, which
requires the affidavit in order to prevent obstruction of interstate commerce) ; United
Public Workers v. Mitchell, note 6 supra.
14. The limitations on legislative power to promulgate presumptions are described
in Mobile, Jackson & Kansas City RR. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35 (1910): Morrison
v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934). But cf. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467
(1943).
15. If membership antedated the enactment of § 12-a, there is a strong probability
that such a provision would also be ex post facto. See Garner v. Los Angeles Board
of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 721 (1950).
16. See Garner v. Los Angeles Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 723-4
(1950).
17. Kennell v. Rider, 225 App. Div. 391, 233 N.Y. Supp. 252 (3d Dept. 1929),
aftirmed, 252 N.Y. 602, 170 N.E. 159 (1930) ; Potts v. Pardee, 220 N.Y. 431, 116 N.E.
78 (1917).
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dence adequate to rebut the resulting presumptions of advocacy and of
continuing membership. Ordinarily it will be extremely difficult to prove
that a teacher knew the purposes of a listed organization without heavy
reliance on inferences from the notoriety of those purposes or from the
knowledge of a reasonable man under the circumstances. It is possible
that in practice knowledge will be inferred from little more than the fact
of membership, which is a position far removed from the requirement of
actual knowledge in the statute as sustained. If the Board establishes
knowledge by a preponderance of the evidence, there remains the problem of whether a teacher's flat denial of advocacy of overthrowing government or his assertion of a different purpose in membership will be "substantial" evidence sufficient to overcome the prima facie case. The point
is important, for generally little corroborative evidence will be available.
These operational uncertainties prompted the dissent of Justice Frankfurter,1 8 who challenged the wisdom of deciding the validity of a complex
statutory scheme without a concrete case before the Court and before the
Board of Regents had demonstrated in practice the procedural and evidentiary safeguards that would be employed. With so much of the procedure still nebulous, and with the extent of the inhibitions upon free association undefined, Justice Frankfurter's position serves to emphasize
the narrowne'ss of the holding. The instant case decided only that if the
procedures of the Feinberg Law, as construed by the Court of Appeals, are
strictly applied, no question of procedural due process arises. If departures
from this procedure bring a new case before the Court, perhaps fuller recognition will then be given to the tremendous impact of a loyalty trial upon
the individual and the dangers of enforced educational orthodoxy inherent
in such legislation."9

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-HUMAN RIGHTS PROVISIONS OF U. N. CHARTER NOT SELF-EXECUTING-ALIEN LAND LAWS DENIAL OF EQUAL PRO-

TEcTION-California's alien land laws I forced escheat of lands belonging
to an alien Japanese, ineligible for citizenship under federal naturalization
laws. On appeal from the judgment of escheat, the District court of appeals
reversed, holding that the human rights provisions of the United Nations
18. Instant case at 387. Justice Frankfurter would have dismissed for lack of
standing of the parties and insufficient ripeness of the constitutional question: the
parents and taxpayers' injuries were too speculative, and the teachers' had suffered
no injury, on the basis of United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1946).
The majority of the Court did not discuss the jurisdictional issue or attempt to
distinguish Doremus v. Board of Education, 72 Sup. Ct. 394 (1952), decided the same
day, in which it was held that taxpayers had no standing to challenge a New Jersey
statute requiring daily Bible reading in state schools.
19. See the dissents of Black and Douglas, JJ., instant case at 387, 392.
1. CAL. GEN. LAws Act. 261, §§ 1, 2, 7 (Deering, 1944).
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Charter 2 had become part of the supreme law of the land ' and are "paramount to every law of every state in conflict with [it]." 4 The California
Supreme Court rejected the treaty argument as a basis for overturning the
statute, holding that the charter is not self-executing and requires congressional implementation before it becomes binding upon the courts. Instead, the court held the statute unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Sei Fu.Jii v. California,
242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952).
In rejecting the U. N. Charter as the basis for voiding the alien land
law, the court reached a not unexpected result.5 Inasmuch as Congress has
passed no laws to effectuate the charter provisions in question, the California statute would be invalidated by those provisions only if the charter
could operate "by the force of the instrument itself." o The distinction between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties was first enunciated
by Chief Justice Marshall in Foster v. Neilson.7 Only the former immediately bind the courts and supersede all inconsistent legislation; 8 the
9
others must first address themselves to Congress for enabling legislation.
Whether a particular treaty is to be treated as self-executing depends upon
the intent of the contracting parties as manifested by the language of the
document, its subject matter, and the circumstances under which it was
executed. 10 It is possible that the treaty itself will stipulate that it will
In the absence of an express statement of its
be non-self-executing.:"
effect, the construction of the treaty is properly for the court.
2. U.N.

CHARTER

Art. 1: "The purposes of the United Nations are:

"(3) To achieve international cooperation . . . in promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction
as to race, sex, language, or religion ;"
Article 55(c) provides that the United Nations shall promote "universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions as to race, sex, language or religion."
Article 56: "All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action
in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55."
3. U.S. CoNsT. Art. VI: "This Constitution, and the laws of the United States

which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
land ;"

4. Sei Fujii v. California, 217 P.2d 481, 488 (Cal. App. 2d Dis. 1950).
5. See 99 U. OF PA. L. REv. 253 (1950) ; Hudson, Charter Provisions on Human
Rights in American Law, 44 Am. J. INT'L. L. 543 (1950). But see Wright, National
Courts and Human Rights-The Fujii Case, 45 Am. J. INT'L. L. 62 (1951).
6. Cf. United States v. Perchman, 7 Pet. 51, 88-89 (U.S. 1833).
7. 2 Pet. 253 (U.S. 1829).
8. Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenach,
311 U.S. 150 (1940).
9. Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. 253, 314 (U.S. 1829).
10. See Evans, Some Aspects of the Problem of Self-Executing Treaties, 1951
PROCEEDINGS, Am,. Soc. INT'L. L. 66, 74; Chafee, Legal Problems of Freedom of
I7formation in the United Nations, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 545, 563 (1950).
11. Evans, supra note 10, at 74.
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The language of the charter invoked in the instant case is of general
scope. The Preamble and Article 1 state the collective purposes of the
United Nations. Article 55 in part pledges members to promote "universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for
all without distinctions as to race.

.

.

." Article 56 pledges the members

to take joint and separate action "for the achievement of the purposes set
forth in Article 55." Thus, Article 56 would indicate an intent on the
part of the signatories that the provisions are not self-executing as written. They create only an obligation to cooperate in promoting certain ends,
which must await congressional implementation.' 2 Besides the language
of the charter, testimony prior to senate ratification indicates that this
government's representatives in drafting the treaty believed the charter
constituted only recommendations to the signing nations.'8 Buttressing
this interpretation of these sections is the accepted canon for construing
formal documents: when language is properly used in one portion of the
instrument to achieve one result, the same effect will not be given to different language elsewhere in it. Other articles of the charter, granting diplomatic privileges and immunities, 14 manifest a clear intent to be selfexecuting and have been so held.15 Since the same treaty may contain
both self-executing and non-self-executing provisions, 16 it seems proper
to deny self-executing effect to the human rights provisions in view of
their language.
Although the charter itself does not supersede inconsistent state legislation, it does express a policy against discriminatory legislation to which
courts will give weight. 17 Thus the California court in the instant case
properly considered the ratification of the charter as one factor in approaching the constitutional question arising from the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The equal protection clause applies in terms to all persons within the
jurisdiction of the states, and it is well-settled that an alien may invoke
the amendment's protection.' 8 One of the rights protected by the amendment is the right to own, use, enjoy and dispose of property; 'o and although
12. Hudson, supra note 5, at 545.
13. Hearings before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Charter of
United Nations, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1945).
14. U.N. CHARTER Art. 104, 105.
15. Curran v. City of New York, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1947). Cf. International
Organizations Immunity Act, 59 STAT. 669 (1945), 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1946), made

applicable to the United Nations by Exec. Order No. 9698, 3

CODE FED. REGS.

102

(Supp. 1946).
16. See Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 738 (1943) (concurring
opinion).
17. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 649, 673 (1948) (concurring opinions) ; Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 606, 204 P.2d 569, 579 (1949) ; Re
Drummond Wren, [1945] 4 D.L.R. 674, 677.
18. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356

(1885).

19. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60
(1917).

1250

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 100

the state may control the ownership of property within its boundaries in
a legitimate exercise of police powers, 20 that control is subject to the
proscriptions of the amendment. The question presented in this case is
whether there is sufficient justification for the alien land laws as valid
police regulation to permit the discriminatory effects which those laws
produce. When the precise question was presented thirty years ago,
the Supreme Court decided in the affirmative. 21 In Terrace v. Thompson 22 the Court held that a Washington statute prohibiting a non-declarant
alien from owning land was valid, because the classification was reasonable
in light of distinctions made in the immigration laws, and since the interests
of non-citizen land-owners in the welfare of the state might properly be
deemed suspect. In addition, the Court foresaw the possibility of aliens
owning or controlling all land within the state.2 On the authority of this
decision the Court upheld the validity of the California land laws here
in question.24 Recent cases, however, have cast doubt on the continued
25
vigor of these decisions. In Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission,
the argument that federal naturalization classifications are automatically
proper for state legislative purposes was rejected, and the burden was
placed upon the states to justify a borrowed federal grouping in the same
manner as any other classification it might seek to impose. The Takahashi
case followed shortly upon Oyama v. California,26 which held unconstitutional a presumption declared by the alien land laws. Four justices
thought the entire statute unconstitutional, and that the cases supporting
it should have been overruled. They concurred in the majority opinion of
Chief Justice Vinson, which assumed the constitutionality of the statute
for the purposes of argument only.27 In light of these decisions and the
heavy burden, imposed since the Terrace case, on a state seeking to impose
classifications on the basis of race, 28 reexamination of the earlier decisions was proper. A decision need not be directly overruled before its
binding effect ceases. 29
20. E.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
21. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) ; Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S.
225 (1923).
22. 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
23. Id. at 220-221.
24. Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) ; Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313
(1923); Frick v. Webb. 263 U.S. 326 (1923); cf. Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S.
258 (1925) (conspiracy to violate alien land laws).
25. 334 U.S. 410, 418-421 (1948) ; see Justice Murphy concurring in Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633, 664 (1948).
26. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
27. Id. at 646.
28. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1942) ; Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948).
29. Thus, in Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350 (1928) the Court held that a state
could not constitutionally fix the maximum fee which a private employment agency
might collect from an applicant for employment, since the business was not one
"affected with a public interest." Subsequently in a series of cases the Court upheld
the validity of price-fixing and wage and hour legislation, and finally, in Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), rejected the "affected with a public interest" test for
regulation of business. Then in 1940, the Nebraska Supreme Court, presented with
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The decision in the instant case rests ultimately on the inability of the
state to justify the statute on any grounds other than effectuating racial
discrimination.30 By invalidating the statute on this ground, the California court has brought itself in accord with the Oregon Supreme Court,
which recently reconsidered and struck down a similar land law. 3 . Utah
has abrogated a comparable statute by legislation,3 2 and the number of
states with alien land laws is decreasing. Proposed legislation before Congress which would remove naturalization barriers against the last ethnic
group presently ineligible for citizenship 3 will take the force from more
state alien land laws discriminating against ineligible aliens.&3 4 In invalidating the land law on other grounds than the court below, the California court
has removed a doubtful precedent and replaced it with a strong one.

CORPORATIONS-SEcuRITIEs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-PARTIES PRO-

TECTED AND TYPE OF TRANSACTION CovERED BY

RULE

X-10B-5-Defend-

ant Feldmann, president of Newport Steel Corp., chairman of its board of
directors and owner of voting control,' sold his stock to defendant Wilport Corp. 2 at a price twice the then market value.3 Wilport thereby obtained a "captive" source of steel during the market shortage.4 Feldmann
and the other directors immediately vacated their positions which were filled
by the individual defendants, officers and directors of Wilport, who subsea statute almost identical to that in the Ribnik case, considered Ribnik as controlling

and invalidated the statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the drift
away from the earlier decision had destroyed it as precedent. Olsen v. Nebraska,
313 U.S. 236 (1941).
30. Although the statute applied to all ineligible aliens, its practical effects were
felt solely by Japanese. The original act was passed in a time of racial ill-feeling.
The dangers anticipated by Japanese tenancy did not and could not occur. The number of Japanese aliens in California is few and is growing even smaller. Their land
holdings, percentagewise, are less than minimal. See, generally, McGovney, The
Anti-Japanese Land Laws of California and Tei Other States, 35 CALIF. L. Ray. 7
(1947) ; see also concurring opinion of Justice Murphy in Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633, 650-671 (1948).
31. Kenji Namba v. McCourt, 185 Ore. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949).
32. UTAH CODE tit. 78, c. 6a (Supp. 1951).
33. N.Y. Times, April 26, 1952, p. 1, col. 6.
34. In addition to the California-type statutes which bar all ineligible aliens from
acquiring any property rights, e.g., ARIz. CODE ANN. 71-201 (1939), some states
permit ineligibles to hold property only for a limited length of time, e.g., Miss. CoDE
ANN. § 842, or bar non-resident ineligibles from holding, e.g., TEX. Civ. STAT. ANN.
tit. 1, art. 167 (Vernon, 1947). The statutes are collected in MuRRAY, STATES' LAWS
ON RACE AND COLOR (1950), an invaluable compilation for research in this area.
1. Feldmann owned approximately forty per cent of the common stock; the remaining stock being publicly held and scattered among thousands of small investors.
2. It was alleged that several weeks before the sale, Feldmann rejected an offer
of merger with another company which would have been highly profitable to all the
stockholders of Newport. Feldmann notified the stockholders of the rejection by mail.
3. The stockholders alleged that one-half of the amount was payment for control.
4. Wilport was a corporation formed by ten manufacturers of finished steel for
the purpose of purchasing control of Newport.
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quently sent a letter to the Newport stockholders reporting the Feldmann
transaction, but failing to disclose the purchase price or that Newport was
to become a captive subsidiary. Certain minority stockholders brought a
representative suit alleging a violation of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19345 and Rule X-10B-5 of the SEC 0 in that defendants
used the mails 7 to defraud the stockholders of Newport and the corporation in the sale of Feldmann's stock. The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, and the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, without deciding that defendant's conduct was fraudulent, affirmed on the grounds that the Securities Exchange
Act § 10(b) and Rule X-10B-5 were aimed only at a fraud perpetrated
upon a buyer or seller of securities and had no application to a breach of
a fiduciary duty by a corporate insider resulting in fraud upon those who
were not buyers or sellers. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d
461 (2nd Cir. 1952).
The federal government has enacted three general anti-fraud provisions,
namely: § 17(a) of the Securities Act 8 which only applies to sales,
§ 15(c) (1) of the Securities Exchange Act 9 which applies to sales and
purchases by brokers or dealers, and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act which applies to both sales and purchases by anyone. Fraud as used
in these provisions is undefined, 10 but because of the legislative background
it seems reasonable to assume that, at the very least, the most liberal common law requirements of deceit govern. Because § 10(b) was not self
executing," these provisions failed to cover a fraud on a seller of securities by the purchaser if the latter was not a broker or a dealer. To correct this serious defect the SEC 12 acting under § 10(1)) adopted Rule
X-10B-5 which merely borrows the language of § 17(a) of the Securities
Act adding a phrase covering fraud "upon any person, in connection with
5. 48 STAT. 881, 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §78 (1946).
6. Exchange Act Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942), 17 CODE FED. REGS. § 240.10b-5
(1949).
7. The use of the mails or other instrumentality of interstate commerce was required for a violation of Rule X-10B-5.
8. 48 STAT. 84 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1946).
9. 49 STAT. 1378 (1936), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 780(c) (1946).
10. Courts have repeatedly said that the fraud provisions are not limited to circumstances giving rise to a common law action for deceit. Norris & Hirshberg, Inc.
v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 71 F.
Supp. 457 (D. Del. 1947).
11. § 10(b) is not operative in the absence of specific rules.
12. In the revision program of 1941 the SEC and the Securities Industry suggested an amendment to extend § 17(a) of the Securities Act to cover purchases,
but due to the war this program was abandoned. See Hearings before House Colnmittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on a Comparative Print Showing Proposed
Changes in the Securities Act of 1933 and the Secitrities Exchange Act of 1934, etc.,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. 856-7 (1941); REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE WITH THE
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND ITS STAFF
AMENDING THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND THE EXCHANGE

(1941).

ON

ACT

PROPOSALS FOR
OF 1934, 164-167
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14
the purchase or sale of any security." 13 An SEC press release, a dis5
trict court case without an opinion,' and the instant case are the only
authorities as to the scope of these words.-6
In the present case it was contended that the proscription of fraud
"Cupon any person" included the common law liability of those who abuse
the trust of their corporate positions "in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security," and that the applicability of Rule X-10B-5 was not
limited to actual purchasers or sellers of securities. The court rejected
this contention holding that the words "any person in connection with the
purchase or sale" defined the class protected by the rule. 7 Accordingly,
even assuming that the minority stockholders were defrauded, they could
not recover in this action since they were outside the class protected by Rule
X-10B-5. Though on the facts of this case the result is persuasive, it
should be noted that this decision need not be interpreted as restricting the
scope of the rule to situations where there is privity of sale or purchase
with the defrauder. To do so would not only disregard the fact that the
word "sale" which appears in § 17(a) is repeated in § 10(b) and in
X-10B-5,' 8 but would exclude situations which clearly fall within the purpose of the statute.' 9

13. § 17(a) (3) of the Securities Act renders it unlawful, "to engage in any
transaction, practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon the purchaser." § X-10B-5 (3) reads: "to engage in any act, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." [Italics supplied.]
14. The court relied on Securities and Exchange Commission Release No. 3230
which states at page 183, 184: "The Securities and Exchange Commission today
announced the adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection with
the purchase of securities. The previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase
of securities applied only to brokers and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in
protections against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals
or companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud in their purchase. .. ."
15. McManus v. Jessup & Moore Paper Co., Civ. No. 8015, E.D. Pa., July 30,
1948 (plaintiffs, minority stockholders of the Paper Co., complained that the sale by
former majority stockholders and the management of their stock to the N.Y. Post
Corp. at a large profit was effected by fraud. Though the plaintiffs were not parties
to the sale transaction, Judge Bard entered an order denying a motion to dismiss without opinion).
16. See Loss, SEcumiTis REGULATION (1st ed. 1951).
17. Although the court based its conclusion partly on legal history, that history
only shows that the present situation was not considered.
18. This repetition purports to give sellers as well as purchasers some additional
rights. One of these rights would seem to be freedom from the privity requirement
of § 17(a) which proscribes fraud only "in the sale of securities", while X-10B-5 reads
"inconnection with the sale of securities". This reading allows recovery in the situations of note 19 infra.
19. The following are illustrations where Rule X-10B-5 should apply and which
fall within the purpose of the Securities Act:
(a) The president of a corporation, knowing oil was just discovered on the
corporation's land, sends a letter to all stockholders in which he does not disclose the oil discovery, but in which he offers to purchase their stock at X
dollars. S sells to the president, and Y, relying on the president's quoted price
as the fair value, sells his stock to a third person at that price or makes a gift of
it using the quoted price as an indication of its worth. S can sue for damages
and rescind-Y should be allowed a suit for damages.
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The result in the instant case could have been reached by reasoning
tending to have a less restrictive effect upon the coverage of Rule
X-10B-5 2 0 Instead of deciding the scope of the words "any person" the
court could have clearly placed its decision on the broader grounds of
whether the fraud pleaded, i.e., a transaction which primarily involved
fraudulent mismanagement resulting in a violation of a fiduciary relationship, 2 was the "fraud" which the rule was intended to cover 22 A negative
answer would be indicated, in view of the fact that all action taken by
the SEC under the securities regulation has concerned the disclosure of
inside information in connection with sales or purchases of securities. The
SEC has never attempted to monitor the field of corporate management or
to correct the many and varied abuses of corporate fiduciary relationships.
Whether or not it has that power,2 3 there should be a clearer manifestation of intent to exert it than is found in the words "upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." The court at
the end of its opinion seems to follow this reasoning as it states ".

.

. that

section [10(b)] was directed solely at that type of misrepresentation or
fraudulent practice usually associated with the sale or purchase of securities rather than at fraudulent mismanagement of corporate affairs. .. ."
If courts in the future will restrict the holding in the instant case to the
immediate quoted phrase, the vitality of Rule X-10B-5 will not be seriously impaired.
(b) An insider, who knows Z stock is worth twice its current market value,
places a purchase order with broker A. Broker A circulates a purchase order
on the over-the-counter market. Broker B solicits from investor X and fills A's
order, A in turn delivering the stock to the insider. X should be allowed to sue
the insider.
20. See an excellent note, The Prospectsfor Ride X-1OB-5: a Energing Remedy
for Defrauded Investors, 59 YALE L.J. 1120, 1137 (1950).
21. Under the facts pleaded it is doubtful whether plaintiffs have made out a
common law cause of action. The theory would be a violation of a duty imposed on a
corporate official who is a majority stockholder not to sell his control to anyone who
he knows or has reason to know will "fleece" the corporation. See Insuranshares
Corp. of Del. v. Northern Fiscal Corp., Ltd., 35 F. Supp. 22 (E.D. Pa. 1940) ; Dale
v. Thomas H. Temple Co., 186 Tenn. 86, 208 S.W.2d 344 (1948) ; Gerdes v. Reynolds,
28 N.Y.S.2d 622 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
22. In the instant case the letters were not part of the scheme to defraud nor did
they give rise to the cause of action; i.e., if the letters had stated that the corporation
was to become a captive subsidiary the common law cause of action, if it existed at all,
would still exist regardless of the disclosure in the letters. The important advantage
plaintiffs would derive from bringing their action under the Securities Act would be in
the liberal service and venue provisions of § 29(b), 48 STAT. 903, as amended by,
52 STAT. 1076 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1946).
23. Mr. Corcoran, one of the drafters of the Securities Exchange Act stated that
the Act was aimed at four general fields: (1) control of credit in the stock market,
(2) protection of investors from manipulation of the stock market machinery, (3)
protection of investors from exploitation by corporate insiders. In explanation of (3)
he stated: "Lack of information on the part of investors and ignorance of what they
are buying is one of the real factors. . . ." The last field (4) concerns regulation
of the over-the-counter market in unlisted securities in order to protect listed securities
from having the provisions of this law so burdensome on them that a corporation with
unlisted securities will be in a preferable position. Hearingsbefore Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency on S. Res. 84, 56, and 97, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 6465-6.
Note that none of these fields include corporate mismanagement.
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POLICY" AND THE
INCOME TAXATION-DEDUCTIONS-"PUBLIC
"ORDINARY AND NECESSARY" REQUIREMENT !--Pursuant to agreements
reflecting an established and widespread practice in the optical business,
taxpayer opticians paid to oculists who prescribed the eyeglasses which they
(the opticians) sold, one-third of the sale price of the glasses. No state or
federal statute prohibited such "kickbacks." 2 Taxpayers treated these payments to the doctors as ordinary and necessary expenses of carrying on
business 3 and deducted them from their gross income. 4 In 1943 and 1944
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue disallowed the deduction. The
Tax Court sustained the Commissioner's determination, holding that the
payments were contrary to public policy and, therefore, not deductible. 5
The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. 6 The United States Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the "kickbacks" were deductible because they
were ordinary and necessary business expenses. Lilly v. Commissioner,
72 Sup. Ct. 497 (1952).
Sec. 23(a) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code allows deductions
of all "ordinary and necessary" business expenses.7 Courts have in general
looked toward public policy considerations to determine whether such expenses should be deductible. Penalties incurred by violations of statutes s
and illegal payments of bribes 9 have been held to be non-deductible. Expenses of operating illegal businesses obtain no clear cut rule. Courts
apparently allow deductions for expenses normally associated with running
a business but as to less usual expenses speak of public policy. 10 Prior to
1943, where no specific statute had been violated certain expenses of an

1. See generally, 4 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION §§ 25.10225.105 and §§ 25.35-25.37 (1942); Notes, 51 COL. L. REv. 752 (1951), 54 H.Aiv. L.
REv. 852 (1941).
2. In 1951 taxpayers' state (North Carolina) passed a law outlawing the practice.
N.C. GEN. STAT. c. 1089, §23 (1951). Washington and California also have laws
against such "kickback" agreements. WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10185-14 (Supp.
1949); CAL. BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE §§ 650, 652 (1951).
3. "All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable
year in carrying on any trade or business" are allowed as deductions from gross income
in computing net income. INT. REv. CODE § 23(a) (1) (A).
4. The occulists included the payments in their gross income.
5. 14 T.C. 1066 (1950).
6. 188 F.2d 269 (4th Cir. 1951).
7. See note 3 supra.
8. E.g., Great Northern Ry. v. Commissioner, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir. 1930);
William F. Davis, 17 T.C. 549 (1951). But cf. Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner,
175 F.2d 711 (2nd Cir. 1949) (innocent overcharges violating the Emergency Price
Control Act held to be deductible because no sharply defined policies of Act frustrated); National Brass Works v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1950)
(amount of overcharge paid in settlement Of government claim for treble damages for
an innocent overcharge violating price regulations of OPA held to be not a penalty
and deductible).
9. T. G. Nicholson, 38 B.T.A. 190 (1938).
10. Compensation paid to employees in gambling establishments is deductible.
G. A. Comeaux, 10 T.C. 201 (1948). "Protection money" paid to stay in the illegal
business is not an ordinary and necessary expense. Cohen v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d
394 (10th Cir. 1949) ; Maddas v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 572 (1939), aff'd, 114 F.2d
548 (3d Cir. 1940).
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unethical nature were held to be non-deductible." The rationale of these
decisions seems to be that if a contract is unenforceable because it is against
public policy, then payment pursuant to such a contract is not an ordinary
and necessary business expense. However, in at least one case 12 the court
looked only to policy as defined in statutory law in arriving at the result
that payments were not opposed to public policy. 13 In 1943, the United
States Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Heininger,14 announced a "frustration test." In allowing a deduction for lawyers' fees in an unsuccessful
attempt by the taxpayer to get an injunction against a mail fraud order
issued by the Postmaster General, the Court held that deductions should
be allowed where they would not "frustrate sharply defined national and
state policies proscribing particular types of conduct." Apparently this
decision drew the line beyond which the Tax Court was not to look toward
public policy in disallowing deductions. But that the concept of "sharply
defined policies" has been difficult to apply is manifest from the varying
decisions since the Heininger case. On several occasions the courts used
public policy to disallow a deduction although no state or federal statute
would have been frustrated by allowing it. 15 Other decisions have interpreted "sharply defined policies" as meaning policies defined in statutory
law. 16 In the instant case the Court first determined that the "kickbacks"
were ordinary and necessary expenses within the generally accepted meaning of those words 17 by a consideration of economic factors inherent in
the optical industry. Then they reasoned that, assuming that public policy
considerations could narrow the field of allowable deductions under some
circumstances, nevertheless these expenditures did not frustrate policies
evidenced by state or federal legislative declarations, and therefore did not
11. Textile Mills Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 467 (1941) (lobbying expenses) ; Raymond F. Flanagan, 47 B.T.A. 782 (1942) (expenses entertaining public
officials in order to get government contracts) ; Charles H. McGlue, 45 B.T.A. 761
(1941) (payments to develop political influence); T.G. Nicholson, 38 B.T.A. 190
(1938) (payments to develop political influence) ; Kelley-Dempsey & Co., 31 B.T.A.
351 (1934) (excessive payments to secure materials for work and to insure prompt
delivery thereof). The disallowance in this last case was based not only on the public
policy ground but also because the payments were unreasonable. Where commissions
were paid to salesmen who were primarily hired because they had influence with state
agencies the deduction was disallowed. New Orleans Tractor Co., 35 B.T.A. 218
(1936) ; Easton Tractor & Equipment Co., 35 B.T.A. 189 (1936). But cf. Alexandria
Gravel Co. v. Commissioner, 95 F.2d 615 (5th Cir. 1938), reversing 35 B.T.A. 323
(1937).
12. F. L. Bateman, 34 B.T.A. 351 (1935).
13. "While tipping may be deplored by some, it is a common practice; although
such practice may create discrimination, it is not against public policy, as reflected in
statutory law, and is known to produce results sometimes commendable when other
methods fail." (Emphasis supplied) Id. at 367.
14. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
15. See Kerrigan Iron Works, Inc., 17 T.C. 566, 578 (1951) ; Excelsior Baking
Co. v. U.S., 82 F. Supp. 423 (D. Minn. 1949). Both of these cases involved payments
to clear up labor difficulties.
16. See Polley v. Westover, 77 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Cal. 1948) (trade discounts
allowed); Marra Bros., Inc., P-H 1944 TC MEm. DEC. fr44,404 (1944) ("tips"
allowed).
17. See Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488 (1939); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S.
111 (1933) ; Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
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fall within the class of expenses disallowed because they frustrated sharply
defined policies proscribing particular types of conduct.
Recently there has been a tendency by the Tax Court to use the Internal
Revenue Code to punish violators of laws and to regulate business practices.18 The instant decision is notice to the taxing authorities that the
Code is to be used to tax people on net income and not to enforce other
policies by imposing a tax on gross income. 19 It is significant to note that a
dictum in the instant case apparently restricts the "sharply defined policies"
of the Heininger rule to explicit legislative policies as defined in statutory
law.20 As a practical matter expenses pursuant to agreements contrary
to those statutory policies could be held to be neither ordinary nor necessary
with the meaning of § 23(a) (1) (A) "by virtue of their illegality". 2 1 It
would appear that in the future courts will have to give greater consideration to economic factors such as the duration and extent of the business
practice, the amount of the payment in relation to the service rendered
or the goods received, the consequences if the payments are not made, the
type of business involved, and customs and actions of organizations which
affect competitive standards in determining whether an expense is ordinary
and necessary within the meaning of § 23(a) (1) (A). Where an expense
is an economic necessity only the most explicit public policy will henceforth bar its deductibility.

LABOR RELATIONS-STRIKES AND BOYCOTTS-NATIONAL LABOR REAcT-EmPLOYEE ACTIVITY TO FORCE RECOGNITION DURING

LATIONS

PENDENCY OF REPRESENTATION PROCEEDINGS HELD NOT PROTECTED--The

U.E.W. and an independent union each desired recognition as the exclusive bargaining agent for the production and maintenance workers at the
employer's plant. On July 7, the Independent filed a representation petition with the National Labor Relations Board (the first step in union
election and certification proceedings).' On July 13, the executive board
of the U.E.W. local instituted a consumer's boycott 2 against the employer's
goods in order to force the employer to grant the desired recognition. On
July 21, following a preliminary hearing on the Independent's petition, a
18. See note, 51 COL L. ZEv. 752 (1951).
19. "There is no statement in the Act, or in its accompanying regulations, prohibiting the deduction of ordinary and necessary business expenses on the ground that
they violate or frustrate 'public policy'." Instant case at 499.
20. "The policies frustrated must be national or state policies evidenced by some
governmental declaration of them." Instant case at 501.
21. Instant case at 500.
1. 29 CODE FFD. REGS. § 101.16 (1949) (N.L.R.B. Statement of Procedure).
2. The court did not consider whether this boycott in any way violated the
"secondary boycott" provisions of the LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 61 STAT.
140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (Supp. 1951) (Taft-Hartley Act).
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consent election was set for August 17.3 On August 2, the employer informed the members of the executive board of the U.E.W. local that they
would be discharged unless they called off the boycott. The board members
refused to do so, were laid off the same day, and were later discharged.
Upon a charge brought by these union leaders, the National Labor Relations Board held that the lay-offs and discharges were an employer unfair
labor practice 4 and ordered that these persons be reinstated with back
pay.5 The court of appeals denied enforcement. It is an unfair labor practice for an employer to grant a union recognition as exclusive bargaining
agent while an election to determine that question is pending. The National
Labor Relations Act affords no protection to concerted activity intended to
force an employer to violate the Act. Thus the Board could not interfere
with lay-offs and discharges on account of such activity. Hoover Co.
v. N.L.R.B., 191 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1951).
This decision represents an extension of the doctrine, announced in
American News Co.,8 that in some circumstances it is not an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discharge union members for participating in
a strike designed to force an employer to violate a federal law. Thus, a
minority strike while the majority remains at work and continues to bargain
with the employer has been held unprotected because the interference with
collective bargaining by the majority union violates the purpose of the
Act.7 Before the Taft-Hartley Act expressly so provided,8 it was held
that a strike for exclusive recognition of one union, despite the Board's
recent certification of another, was unprotected because it was an attempt
to compel the employer to violate the Act.9 In enacting the Taft-Hartley
Act, Congress did not intend to interfere with this body of case law. 10
In Midwest Piping & Supply Co. and other cases," the Board established the rule that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to recognize
3. The U.E.W. was not on the ballot due to the failure of its officers to sign
non-Communist affidavits as required by the Act (61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 129(h) (Supp. 1951)). However, it was represented at the preliminary hearing,
and campaigned against the Independent before the election. The Independent won the
election.
4. The provisions of the Act relied upon were: "(a) It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title; . . . (3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization

.

.

."

61

140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 1951).
5. The Hoover Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1614 (1950).
6. 55 N.L.R.B. 1302 (1944), followed by the court in N.L.R.B. v. Indiana Desk
Co., 149 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1945). But cf. Hamilton v. N.L.R.B., 160 F.2d 465 (6th
Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 762 (1947).
7. N.L.R.B. v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1944).
8. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(C) (Supp. 1951).
9. Thompson Products, Inc., 72 N.L.R.B. 886 (1947), vacating 70 N.L.R.B. 13
(1946).
10. SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 28 (1947).
11. Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945), followed in International Harvester Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1949) ; Basic Vegetable Products, Inc.,
75 N.L.R.B. 815 (1948); American Patrol Service, 75 N.L.R.B. 662 (1947).
STAT.
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one union as the exclusive bargaining agent of his employees when election
proceedings have passed the initial stage of filing a representation petition
with the Board, and a real doubt exists as to which union is supported by a
majority of the employees.' 2 The reasons assigned for the rule are that
the employer's action violates his duty of neutrality among the rival unions,
and is an unwarranted interference with the Board's election procedures.' 3
When a strike for exclusive recognition is conducted during the pendency
of election proceedings, the votes of the strikers will be counted. 14 Nevertheless, if the strikers succeed in getting any substantial concessions from
the employer, even short of recognition, the election of their union will be
voided.' 5
A somewhat different situation is presented in the Elastic Stop Nut
line of cases.' 8 In these cases, the Board's regional office had not issued a
notice of hearing,' 7 there had been no consent election agreement and no
election was pending, but rival unions had each claimed to represent a
majority of the employees. The employer had granted exclusive recognition
to one of the rivals, At the unfair labor practice hearing the Board found
that a real doubt concerning representation existed, and held that the employer's recognition constituted an unfair labor practice. The Board's
order in these cases did not impose any penalty upon the employer or
12. No unfair labor practice is committed when: (1) The employer has no reason to doubt the majority status of the union he contracts with. N.L.R.B. v. Standard
Steel Spring Co., 180 F2d 942 (6th Cir. 1950); Gulf Shipside Storage Corp., 91
N.L.R.B. 181, 210-213 (1950). (2) The contracting union's only rival has become
defunct and there is no evidence that the contracting union did not have a majority.
Ensher, Alexander & Barsoon, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 1443 (1947). (3) The representation petition is filed and the contract is made during a year in which the contracting
union is -certified. Lift Trucks, Inc., 75 N.L.R.B. 998 (1948).
A petition to enforce such an unfair labor practice order will be denied when,
because of delay since the events in question; enforcement of the order would no longer
be remedial, but disruptive to collective bargaining. N.L.R.B. v. C.W. Hume Co., 180
F.2d 445 (9th Cir. 1950) ; N.L.R.B. v. Flothill Products, Inc., 180 F.2d 441 (9th Cir.
1950) ; cf. Eaton Mfg. Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 261 (1948) (Board refused to make such an
order on similar grounds)
13. See Midwest Piping & Supply Co., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060, 1070 (1945); Ensher,
Alexander & Barsoon, Inc., 74 N.L.R.B. 1443, 1444 (1947).
14. Columbia Pictures Corp., 64 N.L.R.B. 490 (1945); National Silver Co., 71
N.L.R.B. 594 (1946). In National Silver, Chairman Herzog and Member Reynolds
declined to hold whether the strikers were protected by the Act (concurring opinions,
pp. 602-604). In Pipe Machinery Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 247 (1948), an election was
ordered during the pendency of a strike by one of the rival unions, but all parties had
requested an immediate election.
15. General Steel Products Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 810 (1948). But not when the
concessions are insignificant. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 63 N.L.R.B.
686 (1945).
16. Elastic Stop Nut Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 142 F.2d 371, 379 (8th Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 722 (1944); Douglas Canning Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1005 (1949);
Stanislaus Food Products Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 260 (194); Federal Mogul Corp. 76
N.L.R.B. 1 (1948); I. Spiewak & Sons, 71 N.L.R.B. 770 (1946).
17. Consent election agreements must be entered into by the employer and any
individuals or labor organizations representing a substantial number of the employees
involved. The approval of the regional director is necessary. 29 CODE FED. 1EGs.
§ 102.54 (1949) (N.L.R.B. Rules & Regs., Series 5). If no such agreement is made,
the regional director serves a notice of hearing upon the parties and any known individuals or labor organizations purporting to act as representatives of any employees
directly affected. Id. § 102.55.
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union beyond restoring the status quo ante by requiring the employer to
cease and desist from recognizing the union. If the rule of the instant case
were extended to the Elastic Stop Nut situation, however, the result would
be a penalty upon the recognition strikers and not simply a restoration of
the status quo ante. It is doubtful that such a penalty is proper in the.
absence of a consent election agreement or a notice of hearing to warn the
strikers that the Board will not consider their union as entitled to exclusive
recognition because of a real doubt concerning its majority status. Moreover, such strikers should be protected in the exercise of their economic
power until there is some assurance of Board action to resolve the representation question."' Thus, in I. Spiewak & Sons,19 the Board held that
such strikers were protected against the employer's subsequent unfair labor
practices in connection with the strike.20 For similar reasons, it would seem
that the mere filing of a representation petition without a consent election
agreement or notice of hearing should not have the effect of withdrawing
the protection of the Act from recognition strikers. A contrary rule would
permit employers or rival unions to harass the striking union by simply
21
filing a representation petition.
Thus limited, the holding of the instant case appears to be a proper
extension of the American News doctrine. Before reaching the conclusion
that any type of concerted activity is "illegal" under the Act, with the consequence of non-protection, it would seem that the real inquiry should be
into the likelihood that this type of activity will force employers to violate
the Act, and the existence of practical justification for such an activity. In
the instant case there could be no doubt that the union conduct, if successful, would have forced an employer violation. Moreover, the employees
in the instant case were hardly justified in resorting to the use of economic
power 22 after they had been informed and assured that the machinery provided by the Act would be used to resolve the dispute. The conjunction of
18. Inadequacy of funds and staff occasionally has prevented the Board from
acting upon representation petitions with reasonable promptness. MILLIS & BROWN,
FRo.% THE WAGNER AcT To TAFT-HARTLEY 254 (1950). The Board's operations have
thus not succeeded in eliminating recognition strikes, and they remain numerous.
Id. at 91-93.
19. 71 N.L.R.B. 770 (1946).
20. In Brashear Freight Lines, 119 F.2d 379 (8th Cir. 1941), the court held that
minority recognition strikers were only economic strikers, because the employer was
under no duty to bargain with a minority. There was no majority union. Accordingly, enforcement was denied to an order. for compulsory reinstatement of such
strikers by displacing the replacements. The order is contained in Brashear Freight
Lines, Inc., 13 N.L.R.B. 191, 203 (1939). However, the Brashear case has been
erroneously considered as holding that such strikes are illegal and hence unprotected.
See N.L.R.B. v. Draper Corp., 145 F.2d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 1944) (clearly distinguishable in that there a minority strike disrupting collective bargaining by the
majority union was involved) ; Hamilton v. N.L.R.B., 160 F.2d 465, 469 (6th Cir.
1947) (purely dictum). For a correct view of the Brashear case, see N.L.R.B. v.
Ohio Calcium Co., 133 F.2d 721, 728 (6th Cir. 1943) ; see Western Cartridge Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 139 F.2d 855, 858 (7th Cir. 1944).
21. An employer has the same right to file a representation petition as his employees. 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (Supp. 1951).
22. Undoubtedly the boycott in the instant case affected the employer adversely,
and, indirectly, it therefore may have harmed the public. Had it been a strike, it would
have had a direct and adverse effect upon the public, the employer, and the employees.

19521

RECENT CASES

these two factors should result in a withdrawal of the protection of the
Act.
In situations where a real question concerning representation exists,
the instant case presents employers and rival unions with an opportunity
to protect themselves against the effects of a recognition strike or boycott
by securing Board acceptance of their election petitions, because withdrawal
of the protection of the Act at that point will have a considerable deterrent
effect upon their opponent's tactics. Once the election establishes a majority
union, such activities will remain unprotected during the period of certification.23 This is of peculiar applicability to unions which, like the U.E.W.
in the instant case, cannot secure Board certification because they refuse to
comply with the filing requirements of the Act.2 4 Such unions can force
recognition only by a strike or boycott. The instant case will naturally
be important in industries where real questions concerning representation
often arise; for example, industries with a heavy turnover of employees, or
those hitherto unorganized where independent unions challenge the organizational activities of national unions, as in the South. In such cases the
tendency of this decision will be to induce the unions involved to forego
the recognition strike and boycott in favor of the peaceful procedures
afforded by the Act.

LABOR RELATIONS-TAFT-HARTLEY

AcT-DISCRETIONARY AUTHOR-

ITY OF THE NLRB TO Dismiss COMPLAINTS IN THE BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY-Glaziers' Union, by means of secondary boycotts
in violation of the Taft-Hartley Act,' attempted to eliminate the use of
preglazed material in the building and construction industry in Joliet, Ill.
The NLRB refused to assert jurisdiction against the union on the ground
that its activities had an insubstantial impact on interstate commerce.2 On
appeal the court of appeals held that the Board thereby had abused its discretion. Joliet Contracting Assn. v. N.L.R.B., 193 F.2d 833 (7th Cir.
1952).
The NLRB is empowered to take jurisdiction in any case of an unfair
labor practice "affecting commerce." 3 As the Labor Relations Act existed
prior to 1947, the Board had wide discretionary authority in respect to its
assertion of jurisdiction. 4 Although the NLRB was empowered to act
23. See note 8, supra.

24. See note 3, supra.
1. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (A) (Supp. 1950). For a definition of a secondary boycott, see Wadsworth Building Co., 81 N.L.R.B. 802, 805 (1949).
2. Glaziers' Union Local No. 27, 90 N.L.R.B. 542 (1950).
3. 61 STAT. 1 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (Supp. 1950). This language was
carried over unchanged from the Wagner Act under which it was construed to mean
"all conduct having such consequences that constitutionally [Congress] can regulate."
Polish National Alliance v. N.L.R.B., 322 U.S. 643, 647 (1944).
4 See N.L.R.B. v. Indiana & Michigan Electric Co., 318 U.S. 9, 18-19 (1943);
N.L.R.B. v. Federal Engineering Co., Inc., 153 F.2d 233, 234 (6th Cir. 1946).
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against any alleged unfair labor practice which had more than a de minimis
effect upon commerce, it could decline to issue an unfair labor practice complaint for "policy" reasons. 5 The theory of the decision in the instant case
is that the Board's discretion to refuse to act in disputes affecting commerce
was greatly curbed by the 1947 Act. 6 To meet the criticism that an agency
should not combine within itself the roles of prosecutor and judge, the
Taft-Hartley Act creates the separate office of General Counsel vested with
"final authority, on behalf of the Board," to investigate charges, issue
complaints and prosecute such complaints before the Board.7 The General
Counsel has contended unsuccessfully that this change precludes the Board
from declining to assert jurisdiction on policy grounds after a complaint
has been issued.8 The Board's position that it still has discretionary power
to refuse to act on policy grounds, despite the independent office of prosecutor, has been given judicial sanction.9 Moreover, to permit the NLRB
to invoke limitations on jurisdictions is not inconsistent with the purpose
of separation of functions, which is to prevent the possibility of bias when
disputes are adjudicated by the same authority which supervised their
prosecution." °
However, the legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act indicates that
Congress intended the Board to exercise full constitutional power to prevent
secondary boycotts in the building and construction industry.1
In view of
this, the NLRB at first accepted any case which it felt met the statutory
2
requirement of having more than a de minimis impact upon commerce.'
5. In a recent Board decision "policy" as it existed under the Wagner Act was
justified as follows: "There was nothing unique in the existence of this permissive
power in the Board. Indeed, the presence of this discretion in the administrative
agency charged with responsibility for effectuating the policy of a public statute is
the hallmark of the administrative process.
It is this very characteristic which
distinguishes an administrative agency from a court of law." Haleston Drug Stores,
86 N.L.R.B. 1166, 1168 (1949).
See also Pillsbury, Administrative Tribunals, 36
HARV. L. Rxv. 405, 423 (1922).
6. See especially instant case at 841.
7. 61 STAT. 139 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (Supp. 1950). For a discussion of
this provision see DAvis, ADuINISTRATIvE LAw 406 (1951).
8. A-1 Photo Service, 83 N.L.R.B. 564, 566 (1949). The Board's position in this
matter is that after the General Counsel issues a complaint and prosecutes before an
examiner his "final authority" is exhausted. Any action the Board may thereafter
take, either as a matter of policy or on the merits, is an exercise of its judicial powers
under the Act and not a review of the General Counsel's action.
9. Haleston Drug Stores, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 72 S. Ct. 29 (1951).
See N.L.R.B. v. Denver Building and Construction
Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951).
10. 63 HARV. L. REv. 522, 524 (1950).
For an appraisal of the testimony indicating the presence of bias in Board proceedings under the Wagner Act, see Davis,
Separation of Functions in Administrative Agencies, 61 HAgv. L. Rlv. 390, 409
(1948).
11. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1947) ; SEN. REP. No. 105, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 54 (1947) ; 93 CONG. REc. 4198 (1947). See Shore v. Building
& Construction Trades Council, 173 F.2d 673, 681 (3d Cir. 1949); Walter J.
Mentzer, 82 N.L.R.B. 389, 392 (1949); Watson Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 533, 535 (1948).
For the legislative history of the Act, see N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT (1948).
For a discussion of the parallel
legislative intent to prohibit strikes resulting from jurisdictional disputes in the building industry, see Comment, 60 YALE L.J. 673, 681 (1951).
12. E.g., Samuel Langer, 82 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1949); Wadsworth Building Co.
81 N.L.R.B. 802 (1949).
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However, because of case load, the Board adopted in a series of 1950 decisions specific standards of effect upon commerce which must be shown
before the Board will assert jurisdiction.'3 It is clear that this policy is
based upon a discretionary power which the NLRB claims to possess and
not upon a lack of power to act. The Board does not feel bound by these
criteria for it also reserves the right to refuse to assert jurisdiction on
undefined policy grounds. 14 These criteria were ignored by the Board in
the instant case.
In setting aside the dismissal of the complaint, the court in effect held
that where several related disputes have a substantial impact upon commerce, the NLRB has little or no discretion to decline jurisdiction. In determining the question of the effect upon commerce, the Board considered
the case as a series of separate disputes. In repudiating that standard, the
court said the totality of the situation must be the test rather than the
activities of each individual employer. 15 This total effect theory is based
upon cases in which federal courts affirmed action by the NLRB on its
conclusion that the total effect of a number of unfair labor practices warranted its assertion of jurisdiction.1 6 However, prior to the instant case,
courts have also affirmed the Board's decision to refuse jurisdiction on the
ground that the alleged violations represent a series of relatively insignificant disputes.'I The instant decision severely restricts or eliminates
the Board's utilization of its specialized knowledge in assessing the factual
situation.' 8 On this score the court's scope of review may be questioned.
13. E.g., the Rutledge Paper Products, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 625 (1950) ; The Borden
Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 628 (1950); W.B.S.R., Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 630 (1950).
These
standards are summarized in N.L.R.B. Release No. 357 as follows: "4. Enterprises
which produce or handle goods destined for out-of-state, if the goods or services are
valued at $25,000. a year. 5. . . . [or] furnish services or materials necessary to the
operation of [an instrumentality of interstate commerce] provided such goods or
services are valued at $50,000. a year. 6. Any other enterprise which has: (a) a
direct inflow of material valued at $500,000. a year; or (b) an indirect inflow *of
material valued at $1,000,000. a year." For a discussion of these standards, see
2 CCii LAB. LAw J. 247, 249 (1951). These tests were applied to the secondary
boycott situation in Jamestown Builders Exchange, 93 N.L.R.B. 386 (1951).
14. Local Union No. 12 v. N.L.R.B., 189 F.2d I (7th Cir. 1951); Haleston Drug
Stores v. N.L.R.B., 187 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1951); A-1 Photo Service, 83 N.L.R.B.
564 (1949).
15. The court concluded that the union sought to eliminate wholly the use of
preglazed materials in the building industry in the Joilet area. This same union had
already achieved this result in Chicago. Instant case at 839. The fact that the union
had engaged in the alleged secondary boycott was admitted for purposes of this
appeal.
16. Cases cited, instant case at 841-43.
17. Haleston Drug Store v N.L.R.B., 187 F.2d 417 (9th Cir. 1951); accord,
Herzog v. Parsons, 101 F.2d 781 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Considerations as to whether
particular fact situations represent separate disputes or one concerted effort to bring
about changes in an area are discussed in the recent case of Jamestown Builders
Exchange, 93 N.L.R.B. 386 (1951).
18. In the instant case the principal facts are not in dispute The Board presumably
interpreted these facts as not indicating a comprehensive plan on the part of the union
to eliminate preglazed material in the area. This may be a factual issue which the
specialized NLRB is more competent to decide than the court. See by analogy Judge
Hand in N.L.R.B. v. Standard Oil Co., 138 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 1943). The weight to
be given expertese was somewhat limited in Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340
U.S. 474, 479 (1951).
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Yet the opinion painstakingly reviewed the record and found that the
Board's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. The result
seems sound in view of the extended scope of review which courts of appeals have under the Taft-Hartley Act' 9 and the showing of widespread
results of the union's boycotts.
The court's restriction of the Board's discretion in this area finds
support in the fact that Congress, at the time of the passage of the Act,
thought that virtually all secondary boycotts in the building industry substantially affected commerce. 20 The result in this case increases the significance of the General Counsel's initial decision to commence proceedings
for an alleged unfair labor practice. This would seem to accentuate the
conflict between the General Counsel and the Board which has greatly
impeded the Board's operation. 2t Although this decision limits the discretionary power of the NLRB to dismiss complaints with respect to
secondary boycotts in the building industry, the effects of the present case
are limited by the fact that the Board, as the law now stands, retains the
discretion to determine whether to seek enforcement of its decisions in the
22
courts.
19. The scope of review was extended by the Administrative Procedure and TaftHartley Acts beyond the requirements of the Wagner Act. Universal Camera Corp.
v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474 (1951); N.L.R.B. v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., 340 U.S. 998
(1951).
20. The significance of local secondary boycotts as recognized by Congress is discussed in Shore v. Building & Construction Trades Council, 173 F.2d 678, 681 (3d
Cir. 1949).
21. Because of the confusion and friction caused by the bifurcation of NLRB
functions, a bill was introduced in Congress to abolish the office of General Counsel.
This plan was rejected. For a thorough treatment of this internal conflict, see Comment, 48 MIcH. L. REv. 1149 (1950).
22. Section 10(e) of the Wagner Act carried over unchanged in the new Act
provides: "The Board shall have power to petition any circuit court of appeals . . .
for the enforcement of such order." 61 STAT. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (Supp.
1950). This was construed to prevent any private party from seeking enforcement
of an NLRB order. N.L.R.B. v. Sunshine Mining Co., 125 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1942).
Only the Board may institute proceedings for violation of a court decree enforcing its
order. Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261
(1940).

